Stigma and business failure : implications for entrepreneurs' career choices by Simmons, Sharon A. et al.
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Simmons, Sharon and Wiklund, Johan and Levie, Jonathan (2014) 
Stigma and business failure : implications for entrepreneurs' career 
choices. Small Business Economics, 42 (3). pp. 485-505. ISSN 0921-898X 
, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11187-013-9519-3
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/45562/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
  
Stigma and Business Failure:  
,PSOLFDWLRQVIRU(QWUHSUHQHXUV¶&DUHHU&KRLFHV 
 
Sharon A. Simmons 
Cotsakos College of Business, William Paterson University 
Wayne, NJ  
simmonss6@wpunj.edu 
 
Johan Wiklund 
Martin J. Whitman School of Management, Syracuse University 
Syracuse, NY  
jwiklund@syr.edu 
and 
Jönköping International Business School, Jönköping University, 
Jönköping, Sweden  
and 
Stockholm School of Economics 
Stockholm, Sweden 
 
Jonathan Levie 
Hunter Centre for Entrepreneurship, University of Strathclyde 
Glasgow, United Kingdom 
j.levie@strath.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
We use data from Global Entrepreneurship Monitor to examine the act of entrepreneurial reentry 
by entrepreneurs who exit a failed business. We study reentry by mode of entry and by form of 
organizing. We find that in countries where the levels of stigma and regulatory conveyance of 
stigma markings were at their highest, entrepreneurs who exited failed businesses were less 
likely to reenter into entrepreneurial activity.  Our finding suggests that negative social and 
economic sanctions that are associated with stigma markings speak only to one side of the 
entrepreneurship phenomenon. On the other side, stigma can function as a stimulus for 
entrepreneurs to defy the illegitimacy of the failed business and to actively seek out and engage 
in innovative behaviors that contribute to the overall diversity of entrepreneurial activities in 
their country.  
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1 Introduction  
 
Institutional norms, inclusive of formal rules and informal cultural values, set the stage for 
levels of entrepreneurial activity in a country and the associated generation of societal wealth 
(Acs et al., 2008). Because institutional norms dictate legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994), 
entrepreneurs face pressures to act in accordance with normative expectations in order to secure 
necessary venture resources (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). The path of the entrepreneur to 
achieve legitimacy is still widely debated; yet, there is a general understanding that entrepreneurs 
with legitimacy have demonstrated their conformity to the rules and normative expectations of 
social and institutional stakeholders. Failure to adhere to normative expectations exposes 
entrepreneurs to the stigma of negative social judgments (Goffman, 1963) and leads to the 
economic and social sanctioning of future entrepreneurial activities (Scott, 1987; Landier, 2005). 
As a result, stigma contributes to observed large cross-country variations in the probability of 
entrepreneurial reentry subsequent to business failure (Hessels et al., 2011). 
Stigma is a multilevel phenomenon whereby social groups (macro level) form collective 
judgments about the consequences of bearing a particular stigma marking, and persons (micro 
level) who bear that marking are socialized to incorporate the judgments of the wider society into 
their conception of self (Goffman, 1963). To date, research has addressed how the stigma of 
failure, as symbolized formally by the regulatory environment or informally by cultural norms, 
influence outcomes such as overall entrepreneurial level and diversity in a country (cf. Landier, 
2005; Armour and Cumming, 2008; Djankov et al., 2007). A core element of stigma theory, 
however, is the negative implications of stigma on those individuals who bear stigma markings 
rather than on the general population.  
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6RPHHQWUHSUHQHXUVZKRH[LW WKHLUEXVLQHVVHV DUH VWLJPDWL]HG $³EXVLQHVV H[LW´ FDQEH
defined as the path or process used by individuals pursuing entrepreneurial activity to depart 
from businesses they founded (DeTienne, 2010).  :KLOH³EXVLQHVVH[LW´ZRXOGDSSHDUWRKDYHD
negative connotation, the exit from a business does not necessarily equate with failure. 
Researchers have examined the characteristics of business exit to find that entrepreneurs can and 
do depart from both financially viable and unviable ventures for a number of reasons, including 
³OHJDOSUREOHPVSDUWQHUVKLSGLVSXWHGHDWKRUVLPSO\DVKLIWLQLQWHUHVWWRFDUU\RQZLWKWKHVDPH
EXVLQHVV´ 6LQJK et al., 2007, p. 32). Irrespective of whether entrepreneurs perceive their 
ventures to be successful or failing, they may choose to exit when opportunity and switching 
costs or other non-economic considerations suggest that more attractive opportunities exist 
(Bates, 2005). This departure can be accomplished via diverse paths such as mergers and 
acquisitions, IPOs, succession, internal and external buyouts and liquidations.  
To date, the literature has remained silent concerning the individual implications of stigma 
for those individuals who have recently exited from businesses that were unsuccessful because of 
too much competition, lack of customers or profit, financing or other problems and incidents 
(Levie, Don and Leleux, 2011; Headd, 2003). :H ZLOO UHIHU WR WKHVH LQGLYLGXDOV DV µIDLOHG
HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ The entrepreneurship literature¶V focus on the macro level aspects of stigma to 
the omission of individual implications is an important shortcoming because it inhibits the 
development and testing of stigma theory within the entrepreneurship domain. The omission is 
particularly significant because the challenge of establishing legitimacy is a core theme that is 
discussed in the entrepreneurship literature as a contributing factor of business failure 
(Stinchcombe, 1965). Consequently, the focus of this article is on how stigma attitudes at the 
macro level influence the behavior of those individuals who are stigmatized at the micro level. 
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Specifically, we ask: how are the future career decisions of failed entrepreneurs influenced by 
variations across countries in negative attitudes towards failed entrepreneurs and formal 
regulatory laws, policies, and procedures that coerce the disclosure of exits from failed 
businesses? 
Building upon the insights of literatures on organizational legitimacy and the social 
deviance of individuals and organizations, we develop a theoretical model of career responses to 
the stigma of entrepreneurial failure and test it across 23 countries from the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) study. We employ Eurobarometer national data on negative 
attitudes towards failed entrepreneurs and World Bank indicators of variations in the extent of 
business disclosure across countries. We test our hypotheses using logistic regression analyses, 
adjusted for national-level cluster effects. The conceptual model and empirical findings are 
indicative of the important linkages that can be drawn between the level of formal controls that 
exist in a country over stigma visibility and the micro-level strategic responses of individual 
entrepreneurs who exit failed businesses.  
We make four distinct contributions to the literature. First, we extend the emerging 
research stream in the organization literature on the stigma of organizations and their managers 
to the context of entrepreneurs who are subjected to negative social judgment from the shutdown 
of failed businesses. Although the stigma of individuals has been well researched by sociologists 
and psychologists, the study of stigma in the organizational setting is a young and emerging 
research stream in the organization literature (Paetzold et al., 2008). We make a theoretical 
distinction between the independent yet related negative social judgments on established 
organizations and their leaders (Sutton and Callahan, 1987) and the interdependent and often 
inseparable negative social judgments on entrepreneurs and their businesses. This important 
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distinction motivates our development of a theory of the strategic responses of entrepreneurs to 
the stigma of failure and the ensuing career outcomes.  
Second, building on the literatures of strategic responses to institutional pressures (Oliver, 
1991) and stigma coping tactics (Miller and Major, 2000; Jones et al., 1984), we develop a 
theoretical model outlining the different career options for failed entrepreneurs and how stigma 
differentially bears upon them.  We draw attention to the fact that a business exit may be a 
stimulus for entrepreneurs and their stakeholders to react to feedback on the success or failure of 
the business. Irrespective of whether the exit is voluntary or driven by economic realities, the act, 
mode and manner of organizing future entrepreneurial engagement are subject to both the 
cognitive processing of the exit by the entrepreneur and to the normative expectations of 
stakeholders. To date, we are not aware of any such models of stigmatized entrepreneurs. 
Clearly, this represents a novel contribution.  
Third, our study of laws, policies, and procedures of entry regulation that convey 
information about prior business failures contribute to research examining institutional pressures 
on the strategic choices of organizations (Oliver, 1991) and the roles of coping strategies in the 
entrepreneurial process (Levie and Autio, 2011; Singh et al., 2007; Shepherd, 2003). In 
particular, we focus attention on the role of the formal institution as an information carrier to 
stakeholders who would otherwise be unaware of the stigma markings of individual failed 
entrepreneurs (Karlsson et al., 2005; Devers et al., 2009); and to the influence of such symbolic 
information on the future career behaviors of failed entrepreneurs.   
Lastly, although contemporary definitions of entrepreneurship separate the act of 
entrepreneurship (new entry) from the modes of entry (i.e., corporate or autonomous) and the 
forms of organizing (i.e., solo or teams) (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000), little research has 
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been carried out that explicitly distinguishes between the µDFW¶ and WKH µPRGHs¶ RI
entrepreneurship. We did this, in the context of institutional pressures exerted upon failed 
entrepreneurs who are stigmatized, by examining entrepreneurial acts of early and late reentry 
separately by modes of reentry and forms of organizing. We found that in countries where the 
levels of stigma and regulatory conveyance of stigma markings were at their highest, the 
likelihood that failed entrepreneurs would reenter into entrepreneurial activity was lower. In 
some contexts, the negative social judgment of failed entrepreneurs interacts with the regulated 
disclosure of historical business data to increase the likelihood that failed entrepreneurs would 
reenter into entrepreneurial activity. This suggests that negative social and economic sanctions 
that are associated with stigma markings may act as a stimulus for failed entrepreneurs to defy 
their illegitimacy and to actively seek out and engage in innovative behaviors (Cliff et al., 2006). 
Hence, stigma can both enhance and diminish the overall diversity of entrepreneurial activities in 
a country.  
In the next section, we develop a theoretical model of the strategic responses of failed 
entrepreneurs to stigma and state five hypotheses. The methods section presents individual level 
data on the reentry decisions of 2,607 failed entrepreneurs situated in 23 GEM countries. The 
results are next discussed. We conclude by discussing the implications of our results for our 
theoretical model, note the limitations of our study, and present opportunities for future research.   
 
2 Theory Development 
2.1 Stigma of Business Failure  
There are three conditions for the experience of business failure to be associated with stigma 
attitudes, sanctions and behaviors. The first condition is the cultural sense-making of 
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entrepreneurial failure as a stigmatizing behavior, i.e. outside of the norm (Cardon et al., 2011; 
Goffman, 1963). It is those activities of entrepreneurs that are outside normative expectations 
that are subject to stigmatization (Goffman, 1963; Jones et al., 1984). Because social norms and 
institutions vary by country, it makes sense that the magnitudes of business failure rates vary, as 
does the association of failure to stigma attitudes, sanctions and behaviors (Wennberg et al., 
2010; Levie et al., 2011). In their study of bankrupt firms, both Sutton and Callahan (1987) and 
Semadeni et al. (2008) found stigma to be damaging not only to the entrepreneurial ventures 
through lost relationships and renegotiated exchange relationships, but also to the individual 
business leaders who report being hurt and embarrassed by tainted labels.  
The second condition is the acceptance of entrepreneurs of the stigma placed on them by 
social audiences. Theory suggests that stigmatized entrepreneurs will accept the stigma through a 
socialization process (Goffman, 1963). This acceptance of stigma often leads to performance 
pressures and social isolation from the dominant group (Settles, 2004; Wyer et al., 2001). Prior 
empirical studies have also demonstrated that the stigma of business failure systematically 
influences the willingness of entrepreneurs to start new ventures or engage in risky activities 
(e,g, Armour and Cumming, 2008).  
To recap, the first two conditions suggest that the stigma of business failure influences the 
entrepreneurial process when there is a normative acceptance of the stigma by both social 
audiences and entrepreneurs who exit failed businesses. The third condition is that the stigma is 
discoverable by the social audience via formal or informal institutions that serve as information 
repositories and carriers.  In the next section, we will discuss aspects of the regulatory 
environment that play a role in this third condition. Figure 1 depicts our model.   
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  _______________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about Here 
_______________________________ 
2.2 Disclosures of Business Failure in Entry Regulatory Environments  
While the ancient Greeks used branding irons and knives to visibly signal that certain 
persons were unfit for society, in modern times information about activities that affect the 
legitimacy of entrepreneurs is often disseminated to social audiences through policies, 
procedures, and formal institutions that collectively comprise the regulatory environment for 
doing business in a country (Devers et al. 2009; Erickson 1962, p. 310). Thus, information 
repositories and the information that is conveyed through these mechanisms are symbolic of the 
branding mechanisms of the ancient Greeks. For it is through these information repositories that 
social, economic and legal actors of a country brand entrepreneurs and their businesses as 
legitimate or illegitimate and, in effect, discourages their entrepreneurial activity (Freel et al., 
2012).  
The disclosure of prior business failures in entry regulatory environments and the depth of 
information that they communicate about the presence of stigma markings vary from country to 
country. Stakeholders in a country negotiate a balance between the societal goals of protecting 
constituents from being harmed by illegitimate entrepreneurs and of encouraging individuals to 
pursue entrepreneurial endeavors. This leads to attitudes, regulatory frameworks and reporting 
requirements that are in line with these societal goals. Empirical studies (e.g. EOS Gallup 
Europe, 2004) suggest that attitudes toward giving failed entrepreneurs the chance to start new 
businesses vary substantially across countries. Similar variation across countries has been found 
in regulatory frameworks and reporting requirements (Armour and Cumming, 2008).  
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Prior research has shown that the regulatory environment plays a role in influencing 
entrepreneurial activity at the macro level (Levie and Autio, 2011; Haselmann et al., 2010). The 
severity of bankruptcy laws in a country represents a salient form of stigma marking that 
influences the levels of entrepreneurship and accessibility to capital markets (Armour and 
Cumming, 2008). On the one hand, disclosure of prior business failures in favor of creditor rights 
may lead to less innovation and growth in the technological industries of countries (Acharya and 
Subramanian, 2009). On the other, the same regulatory frameworks that act to disclose prior 
business failures may be beneficial to the screening process of lenders who extend credit to 
entrepreneurial firms in industries that provide societal benefits to a country (Djankov et al., 
2007). In addition, regulatory environments that promote the stigmatization of failed 
entrepreneurs affect stigmatized and non-stigmatized individuals differently. Severe bankruptcy 
laws, for example, may be viewed positively by the wider society while at the same time causing 
embarrassment to entrepreneurs who are stigmatized from their prior failures (Paetzold et al., 
2008).   
2.3 Strategic Responses to Stigma by Failed Entrepreneurs  
 
In this article, we theorize and test empirically the correlation between institutional contexts 
and the act, mode and manner of organizing entrepreneurial engagement subsequent to exits 
from failed businesses.  In order for a failed entrepreneur to be stigmatized, a critical mass of 
individuals must agree that entrepreneurial failure is illegitimate and they need to associate the 
inappropriate behavior of failure with that entrepreneur (Hudson, 2008). In other words, the 
behavioral responses of failed entrepreneurs are a function of the stigma associated with 
entrepreneurial failure as well as the communication of that information. Thus, there is an 
interaction effect between cultural attitudes that result in the lost legitimacy of failed 
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entrepreneurs and the regulatory environments that confer individual level information about 
prior failure events (Ragins, 2008). It is this combined effect to which failed entrepreneurs need 
to respond (Semadeni et al., 2008). We now turn to the range of behavioral responses open to 
failed entrepreneurs.  
Oliver¶V (1991) typology informs this aspect of the research by providing insight into the 
influence of context and control on strategic responses to institutional pressures. This typology 
identifies theoretical mechanisms that drive strategic responses of organizations and these 
mechanisms are likely to be generally applicable also to the behavior of individual early stage 
entrepreneurs, where individual and organizational responses are essentially identical. Oliver 
identifies five categories of strategic responses that organizations could make in response to 
institutional pressures: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation.  
These responses vary in terms of degree of active agency and the tactics exerted by the 
RUJDQL]DWLRQLH³IURPFRQIorming to resistant, from passive to active, from preconscious to 
FRQWUROOLQJIURPLPSRWHQWWRLQIOXHQWLDODQGIURPKDELWXDOWRRSSRUWXQLVWLF´S 
Importantly, Oliver notes that these strategic responses are a function of the institutional 
pressures exerted on organizations and the extent to which organizations can control the 
environment.  
The Oliver (1991) typology also resonates with discussions of stigma coping approaches 
developed in the stigma literature. Miller and Major (2000) suggest that the coping tactics that 
individuals employ to manage stigma can be categorized as either emotion-based or problem-
focused, depending on the perceptions of control over the visibility of stigma markings. These 
researchers propose that where perceived control over visibility is lower, the approach to stigma 
management is likely to involve emotion-focused tactics to escape, minimize, dismiss, disengage 
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or unlink from the stigmatized failure event. In contrast, where perceived control over visibility 
is higher, the approach to stigma management is likely to involve problem-focused tactics either 
to change the applicability of the stigma marking to oneself, or alternatively to avoid or change 
situations where the stigma marking will influence constituents.   
The typologies proposed by Oliver (1991) and by Miller and Major (2000) provide 
perspectives that highlight the pressures of formal and informal institutions within a country on 
two dimensional levels. The first is the institutional pressure or stigma of business failure (high 
or low). The second is the control over stigma visibility (high or low) that is diminished by the 
public availability of information about prior business failures. In other words, the tactics that 
entrepreneurs deploy to navigate their reentry will vary in terms of degree of conformance to 
normative expectations and also in terms of the control over the choice of tactics that can be 
deployed. Building on these frameworks, we now develop a t\SRORJ\ RI IDLOHG HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ 
responses to the stigma of failure. Our typology consists of four scenarios arranged across two 
dimensions: high and low prevalence of negative cultural attitudes towards failed entrepreneurs 
and high and low visibility of information about prior failures in the entry environment.  We 
discuss each quadrant in turn and present the associated hypotheses.  
2.4 High Stigma and High Visibility Context  
 
High stigma in a country paired with ample access to information about business failure 
represents a scenario that hits failed entrepreneurs the hardest and the Oliver typology would 
suggest this pressures an acquiescent response. People in such countries are generally 
unforgiving of failed entrepreneurs, and associate exits from failed businesses with illegitimate 
behavior. Furthermore, substantial information about the failed business and the linking of the 
individual entrepreneur to the failed business is stored and is easily available to stakeholders. 
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Thus, failed entrepreneurs can be substantially stigmatized under this situation. Miller and Major 
(2000) note that when individuals who are stigmatized perceive their control over the visibility of 
their stigmata to be low, their coping approaches are likely to involve tactics to escape or 
disengage from the stigma of the failed business. This supports the acquiescence response 
suggested by the Oliver typology. 
Failed entrepreneurs who were once legitimate in their countries may find themselves 
stereotypically grouped with illegitimate entrepreneurs who are afforded less access to the 
human, social, and financial capital that are important to the survival and performance of their 
businesses. This illegitimacy is based on a diminished social rather than personal identity, and 
these entrepreneurs may perceive it to be dehumanizing (Crocker et al., 1998). In such cases, we 
argue that the dramatic response would be a permanent exit from entrepreneurial activity because 
this is the domain where the institutional pressures exist (Oliver, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). Similar responses have been documented in the stigma literature, for example, on 
stigmatized criminals (Rasmussen, 1996).  
We have argued above that institutional contexts with more prevalent negative cultural 
attitudes towards failed entrepreneurs and high visibility of information about prior failures in 
the entry environment are more likely to lead entrepreneurs to acquiesce and exit 
entrepreneurship altogether. Oliver (1991) identifies two mechanisms that are likely to lead to 
acquiescence. The first involves unconscious agreement with conventions and customs because 
they are deeply engrained in society. This mechanism drives failed entrepreneurs to internalize 
the general opinion that entrepreneurial failure is illegitimate. In order to wash away the stigma 
marking, they distance themselves from entrepreneurship and seek out some other career.  
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The other mechanism associated with acquiescence is the conscious strategic choice of 
compliance. Because ample information is available about individuals who fail and because 
entrepreneurial failure is stigmatized, failed entrepreneurs are likely to face problems for 
example when negotiating with resource providers. As a result, the entrepreneur may comply and 
exit entrepreneurship to pursue other careers that present more attractive opportunities. Our first 
hypothesis therefore states:  
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood that failed entrepreneurs will be engaged in 
entrepreneurship activity is lower in countries with high stigma and high visibility of 
information about prior failures in the entry environment.  
 
2.5 High Stigma and Low Visibility Context  
 
In the scenario of high stigma and low stakeholder access to information about exits from 
failed businesses, entrepreneurs are still at risk of being stigmatized but can possibly avoid the 
detection of their business history. Because the information about the failure is not readily 
available to everybody, some control over the visibility of the failure shifts from the institution to 
the entrepreneur. Thus, entrepreneurs can better influence and control reentry than in the high 
visibility context discussed in Section 2.4.  Specifically, low levels of institutional control over 
the recording and dissemination of information about prior exits from failed businesses provide 
opportunities for entrepreneurs to avoid the stigma responses of stakeholders and to negotiate 
their reentry. 
Buffering is an avoidance tactic that ³UHIHUVWRDQRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶s attempt to reduce the 
extent to which it is externally inspected, scrutinizHGRUHYDOXDWHG´2OLYHUS 155). It has 
been noted in the literature that the amount of stigma that is transferred between a failed 
organization and its leaders depends on proximity in terms of time and space (Semadeni et al., 
2008). Accordingly, measurable variations may exist in the timeframe and occurrences of failed 
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entrepreneurs who subsequently regain legitimacy (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). Information 
repositories and the information that they convey about prior failures are likely to decay in a 
shorter time frame in contexts where there is less institutional control over preserving the 
visibility of prior failure events. Therefore, as an alternative to concealment, another form of 
compromised mode of entry is for entrepreneurs to regulate their stigma by deferring their 
reentry into entrepreneurship. The next hypothesis states: 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood that failed entrepreneurs will defer reentry is greater in 
countries with high stigma and low visibility of information about prior failures in the 
entry environment.  
Avoidance represents a generic strategic response to institutional pressures in situations 
where organizations have some control over the information that the environment obtains about 
its behavior, but there is little possibility to influence the institution per se (Oliver, 1991). Two 
foreseeable avoidance tactics that may be used by failed entrepreneurs are concealment and 
EXIIHULQJ &RQFHDOPHQW WDFWLFV ³LQYROYH GLVJXLVLQJ QRQFRQIRUPLW\ EHKLQG D IDoDGH RI
DFTXLHVFHQFH´2OLYHUS)DLOHGHQWUHSUHQHXUVDUHPRUHOLNHO\ WR be stigmatized in 
contexts where information about prior failed ventures is widely available. For this reason, when 
entrepreneurs can, at least in part, control this information, it may be in their own best interest to 
conceal any failed entrepreneurial activities. One way for entrepreneurs to conceal the stigma 
attached to prior business failure is by opting for multiple owner reentry (i.e., startups with 
founding teams) as opposed to single owner reentry (i.e., startups with the failed entrepreneur as 
sole owner). This leads to the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 3: The likelihood that exited entrepreneurs will engage in solo owner 
autonomous startup activity is lower in countries with high stigma and low visibility of 
negative information about prior entrepreneurial activity. 
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2.6 Low Stigma and High Visibility Context  
 
The scenario of low stigma and high stakeholder access to information about exits from 
failed businesses is representative of countries where entrepreneurial failure is not severely 
stigmatized but there is ample information about exits from failed businesses. We suggest that 
under such circumstances failed entrepreneurs are likely to pursue compromise-based tactics to 
balance, pacify or bargain with stakeholders (Oliver, 1991). Such responses are only possible 
when there is some flexibility in attitudes towards members of the stigmatized group. Low 
stigma contexts imply that constituents view some aspects of the failure experience positively. 
Because of the opportunity to compromise with stakeholders, failed entrepreneurs are likely to 
continue to pursue entrepreneurial careers. The high visibility of prior failures nonetheless exerts 
pressures on failed entrepreneurs to pursue entrepreneurial careers in domains that are less 
associated with their stigmatized history. This suggests the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4: The likelihood that reentering failed entrepreneurs will engage in startup 
activity as corporate employees is greater in countries with low stigma and high 
visibility of information about prior failures in the entry environment.  
 
 
2.7 Low Stigma and Low Visibility Context  
Low stigma and low visibility contexts provide failed entrepreneurs the most leeway 
because of lack of pressure to conform. This is not to say that entrepreneurial failure is not 
stigmatized but rather that the enforcement of stigma sanctions are not severe. In such contexts 
we would expect either defiant responses or those that dismiss or challenge stigma. Defiant 
responses ³UHSUHVHQW XQHTXLYRFDO UHMHFWLRQV RI LQVWLWXWLRQDO QRUPV DQG H[SHFWDWLRQV´ 2OLYHU, 
1991, p. 157). The challenge tactic reflects a dramatic divergence from social norms, even in the 
face of high sanction. While the dismissal tactic is also a divergence, this tactic is more likely to 
be used when the costs associated with nonconformity are low. For instance, where the act of 
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entrepreneurship is viewed positively, failed entrepreneurs are likely to face limited sanctions if 
they decide to reenter. In such contexts, entrepreneurs may view failure as a badge of honor.  
Landier (2005), for example, quotes an engineer in Silicon Valley in the United States who 
VWDWHV ³hHUH LQ 6LOLFRQ 9DOOH\ LW LV WKH PDUN RI WKH HQWUHSUHQHXULDO VSLULW S ´  However, 
although the stigma of failure is low in the United States, the high level of available information 
about business failures in the entry regulatory environment still represents a form of institutional 
pressure on the entrepreneurs who exit failed businesses (World Bank Doing Business Report, 
2011). In other words, while stigma from failure is less likely to occur in Silicon Valley, the high 
institutional control over disclosure in the United States discourages acts of defiance or dismissal 
in those incidences where stigma of the business exit does occur. Accordingly, we argue that the 
willingness of failed entrepreneurs to defy or dismiss the stigma of failure will be higher in 
countries where fewer people associate failure with stigma; and also, there is low institutional 
control over the visibility of exits from failed ventures. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 5: The likelihood that failed entrepreneurs will engage in subsequent 
autonomous startups is greater in countries with low stigma and low visibility of 
information about prior failures in the entry environment.  
 
 
3 Methodology 
  
3.1 Dataset  
This study utilizes a unique combination of data from GEM, World Bank and European 
Union Flash Barometer (FB).  Our sample is selected from a cross-country pool of individuals 
interviewed during the 2006-2009 fieldwork of the GEM project. The GEM Project is an 
ongoing cross-national study that started in 1999 with the aim of measuring cross-national 
entrepreneurial activity (Reynolds et al., 1999). The GEM respondents in each country were 
randomly selected from the general population of their countries and interviewed about their 
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entrepreneurial attitudes, intentions, and activities. In order to derive the country-level variables 
of stigma sanctions and the disclosure of prior business failures in entry regulatory environments, 
we combined the GEM data with the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) and the 
European Commission Flash Barometer. Complete data were then available for twenty three 
countries1.  
We adopted the approach of Kwon and Arenius (2010) and pooled the GEM data collected 
from the respondents in each country across the 4 year period of 2006-2009 to increase the 
stability of the measures. We then limited our sample to include only failed entrepreneurs, 
defined as those GEM respondents who shut down, discontinued or quit a venture in the past 12 
months because of too much competition, lack of customers or profit, financing problems, 
incidents and µother¶ reasons. We identified and excluded those respondents who exited through 
means of a sale, advanced planning, retirement, or to pursue another job or business opportunity. 
We believe our view of failure is advantageous because legal frameworks differ substantially 
across countries so that in many contexts exit routes other than bankruptcy are preferred for 
failed entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs who shutdown, discontinue or quit an unsuccessful business 
have the potential to be stigmatized in their countries. A total of 2,707 GEM respondents 
between the ages of 18 and 64 from the 23 countries fitted these criteria. We then removed 
portfolio entrepreneurs, i.e. individuals who were running another business at the time they shut 
down the business, on the grounds that the failed business is likely to be less significant to these 
individuals than to a single business entrepreneur.  
Our final sample is comprised of 2607 failed entrepreneurs. Table 1 provides descriptive 
statistics for these failed entrepreneurs in each study year (2006-2009). Table 1 also provides 
                                                          
1
 Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United 
States 
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descriptive statistics of an additional 948 non-failed entrepreneurs in each study year that 
correspond to business exits through means of a sale, advanced planning, retirement, or to pursue 
another job or business opportunity. We excluded these non-failed entrepreneurs from our study.   
_______________________________ 
 
Insert Table 1 about Here 
_______________________________ 
3.2 Dependent Variables  
 
We analyzed the influence of stigma and the regulatory conveyance of stigma on 
entrepreneurship exit, sole owner startup, deferred reentry intention and reentry as employees 
(corporate entrepreneurs) or owners of autonomous start-ups. We used five binary dependent 
variables from the GEM data. These variables enabled us to unlink the act of reentry into 
entrepreneurship from the mode of reentry and form of organizing the reentry.  
The Early Reentry dependent variable measures whether the GEM respondents we identified 
as failed entrepreneurs are engaged in nascent or new entrepreneurial activity. The variable was 
constructed from three GEM variables: (1) individuals who are, alone or with others, currently 
trying to start a new business, including any self-employment or selling any goods or services to 
others; (2) individuals who are, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business or a 
new venture for their employer as part of their normal work; and (3) individuals who currently 
manage and own a business µEDE\ EXVLQHVVHV¶ that is up to 42 months old. By including 
entrepreneurs who started businesses shortly before or shortly after failure, we account for the 
anticipation that entrepreneurs can have about imminent business failure. Shepherd et al. (2009) 
suggest that anticipatory grieving provides entrepreneurs with a means to emotionally cope with 
business failure. We suggest that in the years running up to closure, entrepreneurs may cope with 
imminent business failure by searching for a new business that could be up and running by the 
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time the first business closes. This aspect of coping with business failure has been ignored, at 
least explicitly, in the literature. 
The Late Reentry dependent variable measures whether the failed entrepreneurs DUHµDORQH
or with others, expecting to start a new business, including any type of self-employment, within 
WKHQH[WWKUHH\HDUV¶ Some of the failed entrepreneurs engaged in nascent or new entrepreneurial 
activity also confirmed that they are expecting to start a business in the next three years. To 
resolve this duplication, the Late Reentry variable waVFRGHGDVµ¶IRUUHVSRQGHQWVZKRDUH(1) 
actively involved in start-up effort as owner, no wages yet; or (2) manage and own a running 
business. 
The next two dependent variables examine the modes of entrepreneurship reentry: whether 
the entrepreneurship activity undertaken by the GEM respondents was in the mode of corporate 
reentry or in the mode of autonomous reentry. Corporate Reentry indicates respondent answers 
WRWKHTXHVWLRQµ\RXDUHDORQHRUZLWKRWKHUVFXUUHQWO\WU\LQJWRVWDUWDQHZEXVLQHVVRUDQHZ
YHQWXUH IRU \RXU HPSOR\HU DV SDUW RI \RXU QRUPDO ZRUN¶ Autonomous Reentry indicates 
UHVSRQGHQW DQVZHUV WR WKH TXHVWLRQ µ\RX DUH alone or with others, currently the owner of a 
company you help manage, self-HPSOR\HG RU VHOOLQJ DQ\ JRRGV RU VHUYLFHV WR RWKHUV¶ The 
aggregate of these two variables equates the entrepreneurship reentry dependent variable. 
The final dependent variable is Sole Owner Reentry. This variable examines whether the 
mode of organizing the autonomous reentry was as a solo member reentry or a multiple team 
member reentry. The variable indicates whether the reentry business had a sole owner (1) or 
multiple owners (0).  
3.3 Explanatory Variables 
 There are two explanatory stigma variables. The first explanatory variable, Stigma, is 
constructed from survey data collected for the European Commission on attitudes towards 
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entrepreneurship (Gallup, 2010). The variable measures the percentage of responses to the 
statement µpeople who have started their own business and have failed EHJLYHQDVHFRQGFKDQFH¶
that were strongly agree, agree, GRQ¶WNQRZGLVDJUHHDQG strongly disagree. Using a (-2, 2) scale, 
we weighted the response categories and assigned positive values to the negative social 
judgments about giving failed entrepreneurs a second chance and vice versa.  
 Our second explanatory variable, Regulatory Conveyance of Stigma, is constructed from 
World Development Indicators (WDI) collected as part of the ongoing World Bank Doing 
Business project that collects data on regulations governing small and medium sized business 
operating in 183 economies (The World Bank, 2011). The WDI indicator used to construct the 
Regulatory Conveyance of Stigma variable measures the depth of credit information about 
individuals and firms that are available through public and private credit registries on a 0-6 scale. 
More specifically, this indicator reports whether the positive or negative data on firms and 
individuals are communicated; to whom the information is reported; the age of the information 
and the opportunities for borrowers and capital providers to inspect the information.  
 Figure 2 presents an illustrative graph of the mean standardized distance in Stigma (years 
2007-09) and Regulatory Conveyance of Stigma (years 2005-08) for each country in the study.  
_______________________________ 
 
Insert Figure 2 about Here 
_______________________________ 
3.4 Control Variables  
 It is important that we include individual and country level control variables that are 
predictors of entrepreneurial behavior in our analysis (Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Stam et al., 
2008). On the individual level, we include GEM PHDVXUHVRIWKHUHVSRQGHQW¶VAge, Gender and 
Startup Skill at the time of the GEM interview. These variables provide measures of explicit 
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human capital. Age Squared was also included in our model because of the curvilinear effect of 
age on increasing human capital through accumulated life experiences and decreasing human 
capital due to loss of stamina and risk aversion (Wennberg et al., 2010). On the country level, we 
include a GEM measure of the National Fear of Failure and WDI measures of the Time to 
Resolve Insolvency and GDP Per Capita Growth. We include these variables because prior 
studies have found a systematic relationship between the size and dynamics of the 
entrepreneurial economy and the levels of entrepreneurial activity in countries (Acs et al., 2005; 
Armour and Cumming, 2008). We also included the GEM measure of the National Fear of 
Failure as an indicator of uncertainty avoidance, which has been shown to be negatively 
associated with the entry decision (Autio et al., 2013). Table 2 provides a description of the 
explanatory and control variables in our study.  
_______________________________ 
Insert Table 2 about Here 
_______________________________ 
 
4 Results 
On the basis of level of stigma and visibility of information we developed and tested a 
theoretical model outlining the behavioral options open to failed entrepreneurs and the 
mechanisms that drive failed entrepreneurs to choose different career options. To date, most 
theorizing and discussion of the stigma of entrepreneurial failure has been limited to assuming 
that entrepreneurs acquiesce to institutional pressure. We suggest that depending on level of 
stigma and visibility of information, entrepreneurs are more or less likely to rely on concealment, 
buffering, compromise, and defiance rather than acquiescence. This fine-grained model of 
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responses to the stigma of failure provides valuable theoretical refinement to our understanding 
of the stigma of failure. We now discuss our results and their implications in greater detail. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 The descriptive statistics for the study variables are shown Table 3. In the sample of 2607 
failed entrepreneurs, 24% were identified as engaged in early reentry, of which 10% chose 
corporate reentry and 14% autonomous reentry. Sole owners were 10% of the total sample. 
Lastly, 16% reported deferred intentions to reenter (late reentry). Four out of five (79%) of the 
respondents agreed they had the skill, knowledge and experience to start a new venture. On the 
national level, the mean GDP annual growth per capita was positive for this group of countries; 
the mean national fear of failure rate was 34% of the population; and the mean time to resolve 
insolvency exceeded 1.85 years. 
_______________________________ 
 
Insert Table 3 about Here 
_______________________________ 
4.2 Logistic Regression Models 
In section 3, we hypothesized the effects of stigma and the regulatory conveyance of stigma 
on the act of entrepreneurship (i.e., reentry and deferred reentry), the mode of reentry (i.e., 
autonomous startup versus corporate employee) and the form of organizing (i.e., sole owner 
versus multiple owner structures). The hypotheses were tested using the logistic regression 
models shown in Tables 4 - 8.  The models are adjusted for 23 country clusters in Stata using the 
cluster option. This hierarchical estimation technique adjusts the standard error by computing a 
cluster robust standard error for the coefficient.  The assumption is that the individual level 
observations within each country are correlated (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). This approach is 
an effective means to test the effects of national level variables on individual level variables 
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(Autio et al., 2013).  The full models shown in Tables 4-8 are statistically significant indicating 
that the models that test our five hypotheses are able to distinguish the effects of stigma and the 
regulatory conveyance of stigma on the entrepreneurial activities of the GEM respondents in our 
sample. 
_______________________________ 
 
Insert Tables 4-5 about Here 
_______________________________ 
4.2.1 Acts of Entrepreneurship 
 
Hypotheses 1 (early reentry) was supported in Table 4 and Hypothesis 2 (late reentry) was 
partially supported in Table 5. A strong predictor of acts of entrepreneurship in both models was 
startup skill. This predictor has a significant odds ratios in the range of 1.98 to 2.06 (p<.01) in 
Models 1-3 of Table 4 and significant odds ratios of 1.81 to1.89 (p<.01) in Models 1-3 of Table 
5. For Hypothesis 1, stigma was also predictive of early reentry in Model 2 (0.48, p<.05) and 
Model 3 (0.30, p<.01) of Table 4. The significant odds ratio indicates that failed entrepreneurs in 
countries with high stigma levels have a lower likelihood of reentry.  Further, the significant 
odds ratio of 0.26 (p<.05), for the interaction of stigma and its regulatory conveyance, predicts 
that the likelihood of early reentry in high stigma countries decreases with high levels of 
regulatory conveyance about failure events. As for effect sizes, the pseudo R2 increased from 
0.033 in the base model with control variables (Model 1) to 0.046 in the full model with 
interaction effects (Model 3).   These results support Hypothesis 1.   
As for late reentry, stigma is not significant in Table 5.  The time to resolve insolvency with 
odds ratios of 1.41 (p<.05) in Model 2 and 1.39 (p<.05) in Model 3; and the regulatory 
conveyance of stigma with odds ratios of 1.31 (p<.05) in Model 2 and 1.18 (p<.05) in Model 3 
were significant institution level predictors of the (intended) late reentry of failed entrepreneurs. 
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The interaction of stigma and its regulatory conveyance was also significant. The significant 
odds ratio of 3.37 (p<.01) in Model 3, for the interaction, predicts that the likelihood of late 
reentry intention in high stigma countries increases with high levels of regulatory conveyance 
about failure events. As for effect sizes, the pseudo R2 increased from 0.039 in the base model 
with control variables (Model 1) to 0.054 in the full model with interaction effects (Model 3). 
These results support Hypothesis 2.  
4.2.2 Form of Organizing 
Hypothesis 3 states that the likelihood that exited entrepreneurs organize their reentry as a 
sole owner startup activity is higher in countries with high stigma and low regulatory conveyance 
of stigma. As shown in Table 6, this hypothesis is also supported. Although start-up skill is still a 
strong predictor of the form of organizing with odds ratios of 3.63 to 3.77 (p<.01) in Models 1-3, 
the results suggest that stigma reduces the likelihood that skilled entrepreneurs will organize 
reentry as sole owner startups with odds ratios of 0.29 (p<.05) in Model 2 with only the main 
effects and 0.17 (p<.01) in Model 3 with the interaction effects.  
_______________________________ 
 
Insert Table 6 about Here 
_______________________________ 
Further, the significant odds ratio of .25 (p<.01) in Model 3 for the interaction of stigma and 
the regulatory conveyance predicts that the likelihood of sole owner reentry in high stigma 
countries decreases further with high levels of regulatory conveyance about failure events. As for 
effect sizes, the pseudo R2 increased from 0.040 in the base model with control variables (Model 
1) to 0.054 in the full model with interaction effects (Model 3). These results support Hypothesis 
3. 
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4.2.3 Modes of Reentry 
 
Table 7 shows the effects of the independent variables on corporate reentry. Startup skill was 
found to be a significant predictor of corporate reentry in Model 1 (1.63, p<.05) with only 
control variables and Model 2 (1.62, p<.05) with the main effects.  Startup skill was only 
marginally significant in Model 3 (1.51, p<.10) with the interaction effects.  The significant odds 
ratio of 0.22 (p<.01) in Model 3 for stigma indicates that failed entrepreneurs in countries with 
high stigma levels have a lower likelihood of corporate reentry. Notably, stigma was not 
significant in Model 2 with only the main effects. Further, the significant odds ratio of 0.15 
(p<.05) for the interaction of stigma and the regulatory conveyance predicts that the likelihood of 
corporate reentry in high stigma countries decreases further with high levels of regulatory 
conveyance about failure events. As for effect sizes, the pseudo R2 increased from 0.034 in the 
base model with control variables (Model 1) to 0.057 in the full model with interaction effects 
(Model 3). Hypothesis 4 (corporate mode of reentry) was supported. 
_______________________________ 
 
Insert Tables 7-8 about Here 
_______________________________ 
Lastly, Hypothesis 5 (autonomous mode of reentry) was supported in Table 8.  The 
likelihood of autonomous reentry was significantly decreased by higher levels of stigma with 
odds ratios of 0.49 (p<.05) in Model 2 and 0.43 (p<.01) in Model 3 and also by longer times to 
resolve insolvency with odds ratios of 0.83 (p<.05) in Model 2 and 0.82 in Model 3 (p <.05).  
The strongest predictor in Table 8 is also startup skill, which increases the likelihood that future 
acts of entrepreneurship will be autonomous with odds ratios of 2.11 (p<.01) in Models 1 and 2 
and 2.07 (p<.01) in Model 3. The regulatory conveyance of stigma was not predictive of 
autonomous reentry.  However, the significant odds ratio of 0.62 (p<.05) in Model 3 for the 
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interaction of stigma and its regulatory conveyance predicts that the likelihood of autonomous 
reentry in high stigma countries decreases further with high levels of regulatory conveyance 
about failure events. As for effect sizes, the pseudo R2 increased from 0.027 in the base model 
with control variables (Model 1) to 0.031 in the full model with interaction effects (Model 3). 
 
5 Discussion  
Early studies in the entrepreneurship literature focused on the characteristics of the 
entrepreneur or the institutional context. Contemporary definitions and delineations of the 
academic domain of entrepreneurship emphasize the nexus of profitable opportunity and 
enterprising individuals (i.e., Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). The underlying premise of this 
nexus is that the opportunities that exist are demanded by the potential supply of entrepreneurs 
(Alvarez and Barney, 2007; Kirzner 1999). Accordingly, popular explanations for variances in 
the total entrepreneurial activity across countries focus on cultural norms (Taylor and Wilson, 
2012) and socioeconomic conditions (Acs et al., 2005) that influence the opportunities that exist 
for entrepreneurs.  
A better understanding of the nexus between profitable opportunities and enterprising 
individuals calls for greater emphasis on certain supply- and demand-side explanations of 
entrepreneurial activity that have received little attention in the literature to date (Carter et al., 
2003). Entrepreneurship is an outcome of environmental constraints and individual career 
choices that vary greatly across time and space (Carr, 1996). The reasons for initiating 
entrepreneurial careers differ; so too do the effects of subsequent external and cognitive feedback 
from venture successes and failures on future intentions and preferences for entrepreneurial 
careers (Cassar, 2007). Accordingly, there can be more or less demand for entrepreneurs because 
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of shifts in the institutional pressures and normative expectations for different groups of 
entrepreneurs.  Our findings suggest that shifts in social realities for different groups of 
entrepreneurs, in concert with the cognitive processing of business exits, shape the acts and 
modes of entrepreneurial engagement that occur subsequent to business exits.  Our findings also 
highlight that societal demand for different groups of entrepreneurs is not always equivalent and 
shifts across time and events. 
The reentry of entrepreneurs following the shutdown of a venture is an important 
phenomenon; so are the influences of national contexts and institutional pressures (Autio and 
Acs, 2010) on the reentry decision. There is empirical evidence of cross country differences in 
the probability of entrepreneurial reentry after failure (Hessels et al, 2011). It has been inferred, 
but not tested, that these differences can be attributed to various levels of stigma of failure. 
Previous research in the stigma of failure has found important cross-national correlations 
between indicators of stigma and indicators of entrepreneurial activity (Armour and Cumming, 
2008). Building on the proposition from stigma theory that stigma is a multilevel phenomenon 
(Goffman, 1963), we developed and tested a theoretical model linking stigma at the national 
level to the behavior of individual stigmatized failed entrepreneurs, thus linking the macro and 
micro levels of stigma.  
Drawing upon 2OLYHU¶VIUDPHZRUNIRUKRZRUJDQL]DWLRQVUHVSRQGWRLQVWLWXWLRQDOSUHVVXUHV
we developed and tested D PRGHO RI IDLOHG HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ UHVSRQVHV WR GLIIHUHQW LQVWLWXWLRQDO
norms. We do not mean to suggest in our model that formal institutions and social norms are 
independent of each other. Rather, we believe that with this model we develop a theoretically 
sound typology for understanding the behavioral options available to stigmatized entrepreneurs, 
showing that an arsenal of behavioral options is available to failed entrepreneurs. This has not 
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been sufficiently considered in the literature. Moreover, we derive mechanisms that influence 
which of these options are more or less feasible and when they apply. In considering different 
modes of reentry for failed entrepreneurs, our theoretical model corresponds to contemporary 
conceptualizations of entrepreneurship which emphasize that the act of entrepreneurship (new 
entry) is separate from the form of organizing (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).  
Our results support our baseline hypothesis that failed entrepreneurs are more likely to 
completely exit entrepreneurship and turn to other career options in contexts where there is a 
large critical mass conferring stigma sanctions combined with high institutional control over the 
conveyance of information about the failure. Two different mechanisms may be at play here. 
First, failed entrepreneurs could withdraw from further entrepreneurial attempts because they 
internalize the values of the critical mass that entrepreneurial failure is illegitimate. Thus, they 
view themselves as unfit for entrepreneurship. Second, they may still want to reenter 
entrepreneurship but deem their chances for succeeding the next time to be too small because of 
their stigma marking. Important stakeholders will likely be unwilling to deal with them and 
provide them with the resources needed for success.  
A context characterized by extensive stigma of failure but low institutional control over the 
visibility of stigma markings allows entrepreneurs more freedom to act because they can, at least 
in part, control the information about their prior activities. We hypothesized that this context 
would be associated with two behaviors. First, entrepreneurs would be less likely to start new 
firms autonomously. Second, entrepreneurs would be more likely to defer their entry to a later 
stage, distancing themselves from the failure event (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). We found support 
for these hypotheses. Stigma was found to decrease the likelihood of autonomous startup and 
disclosure was found to have significant direct effects on increasing the likelihood of deferred 
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reentry. Note that if the lower probability of reentry was completely attributed to entrepreneurs¶ 
internalization of the values of the critical mass, there would be no reason for the deferral that we 
observe in countries with high regulatory conveyance of prior failures.  
If the stigma of failure is low but the institutional control over the visibility of the stigma 
markings is high, we hypothesized that failed entrepreneurs have some bargaining power vis-à-
vis the institution. We found support for the notion that in these contexts, entrepreneurs would be 
more likely to reenter entrepreneurship as employees. We believe that this is a very interesting 
finding. In line with our theoretical logic, it suggests that failed entrepreneurs are not simply 
victims to their fate but can pursue more active strategies, negotiating with the constituents in 
their environments. This finding is also in line with the general notion in entrepreneurship 
research of entrepreneurs as active agents shaping their own destinies (Sarasvathy et al., 2003).  
Failed entrepreneurs will employ strategic responses to manage stigma and respond to their 
lost legitimacy. Our empirical findings are that cross-national differences in levels of stigma 
attitudes and in regulatory disclosure of prior business failures do influence the decisions of 
failed entrepreneurs to engage or defer future startup activity, as well as, decisions surrounding 
their modes of entry. The implications of such decisions extend beyond the individual 
entrepreneur to affect the diversity and totality of entrepreneurial activity in the country. After 
all, there are differences in the competencies and behaviors of nascent and experienced 
entrepreneurs (Westhead and Wright, 1998).  
Our overall conclusion is that the correlation between business exits and future engagement 
in entrepreneurship activity is more complex than previously recognized in the literature. Both 
the economic and social realities of business exits and the independent cognitive processes of 
entrepreneurs play important roles in the act, mode and manner of reentry after business exits.  
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Because of the associated learning outcomes, prior entrepreneurial experiences have been 
emphasized in the literature as having a positive influence on the future success of habitual and 
serial entrepreneurs. Our research reveals that the normative and personal expectations of 
entrepreneurs based on the performance of the businesses they have exited can also have a 
negative influence on their subsequent entrepreneurial career paths.  Our findings should 
stimulate future investigations into the policy implications of variances in the social and 
cognitive expectations of entrepreneurs who exit businesses.  We turn to this issue in the next 
section. 
 
6 Implications for Entrepreneurship Policy  
When entrepreneurs fail to sustain viable ventures, the question arises: should policymakers 
encourage or discourage the stigmatization of these individuals, i.e., what are the net welfare 
effects? It has been argued that the stigma of failure has a negative spillover effect in that it 
reduces the willingness of the general public to enter entrepreneurship: the higher the stigma of 
failure, the lower the willingness to enter (Armour and Cumming, 2008). Our research nuances 
this baseline argument and demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between the normative 
expectations and constraints of informal institutions (i.e. the extent of negative attitudes towards 
failed entrepreneurs) and the control over navigating normative expectations imposed by formal 
institutions (i.e. public records of business failures).  
Many national governments try to influence the attitudes of the general public to 
entrepreneurship. Similar efforts could likely be used to try to influence attitudes towards failed 
entrepreneurs. Government control over the normative expectations of the public is reflected in 
regulatory policies and procedures. Further, advances in information technology contribute to the 
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increasingly extensive tracking of business failures. While transparency is usually viewed as 
positive, this research suggests that it can also have negative aspects when it comes to the reentry 
of entrepreneurs in high-stigma institutional contexts. We also provide additional insight into the 
behavioral options open to failed entrepreneurs. Rather than assuming that failed entrepreneurs 
either exit entrepreneurship altogether or reenter by themselves, we have identified a number of 
other alternative paths into entrepreneurship and the factors that influence these choices. For 
example, we show that the act of entrepreneurship (new entry) is separate from the entrepreneur 
career choices as to modes (e.g., autonomous startup, corporate venture) and form (sole versus 
multiple owner startups) of organizing reentry.    
 
7 Limitations and Future Research  
It is possible that we included some entrepreneurs who closed firms that were not failures 
(Wennberg et al., 2010), and excluded other entrepreneurs who were not willing to admit that the 
businesses they closed were unsuccessful. Further, although we tried to isolate autonomous 
startups, there could remain some overlap of autonomous and corporate new ventures.  Such 
shortcomings likely introduce random measurement error which leads to attenuation of results. 
The risk that this measurement error should lead to spurious results is small. Ideally, respondent 
reentry claims would be validated with secondary data from registrations of new businesses or 
similar, but in some countries registration is not compulsory and so no universal double check is 
possible ± indeed, the GEM data is currently the only source of individual-level business reentry 
across nations.  
Our models explain around 5% of the variability in reentry propensity, indicating that while 
the cultural and regulatory effects of stigma are explanatory of entrepreneur career choices 
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following business failure, there is still significant unexplained variance. Future research could 
provide additional insights into this variability by examining how individual and cross-level 
interactions influence the reentry choice, mode or form of organizing (Arenius and Minniti, 
2005). For example, future research can examine if gender and human capital variables such as 
startup skill or education moderate the cultural and regulatory effects of stigma.  
Lastly, the awareness of disclosure of prior business failures in the regulatory environment is 
an important antecedent to the behavioral responses of failed entrepreneurs (Ragins, 2008; 
Goffman 1963). Our study does not examine whether individual failed entrepreneurs had either 
the capacity or willingness to decode the extent of disclosure of prior business failures in their 
entry regulatory environments. Accordingly, opportunities exist for experimental researchers to 
examine whether and to what extent failed entrepreneurs take into consideration the extent of 
disclosure of prior business failures in the entry environment to make decisions about their future 
career choices.  
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FIGURE 1 Stigma and Regulatory Conveyance on Reentry Acts, Mode and Organizing 
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FIGURE 2 Mean Distances for Stigma and Regulatory Conveyance 
 
  
 
 
Un
ite
d 
St
a
te
s
Gr
ee
ce
Ne
th
e
rla
nd
s
Be
lg
iu
m
Fr
an
ce
Sp
a
in
Hu
ng
ar
y
Ita
ly
Ro
m
a
ni
a
UK
De
nm
ar
k
Sw
ed
en
No
rw
a
y
Ge
rm
an
y
Tu
rk
ey
Po
rtu
ga
l
Ire
la
nd
Ic
e
la
n
d
Fi
n
la
n
d
La
tv
ia
Cr
oa
tia
Sl
ov
e
ni
a
Cz
e
ch
 
Re
pu
bl
ic
        Regulatory Conveyance (2005-08) 
        Stigma (2007-09) 
 40 
 
 
TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics of Business Exits 
Reasons For Shutdown 2006 2007 2008 2009 * N 
            
Business Failure           
Unprofitable Business  **157 176 242 239 814 
Finance Problems      223 74 80 110 487 
Unspecified Closures  381 282 310 333 1306 
  761 532 632 682 2607 
            
Other Exits ***           
 New Opportunities 91 126 130 133 480 
Planned/Retirement 95 112 141 120 468 
  186 238 271 253 948 
            
  * Post-adjustments to GEM data for missing observations and portfolio entrepreneurs. 
** 2006 variables are 'too much competition' and 'lack of customers.'   
*** Excluded from the model as non-failure exits.       
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TABLE 2 Descriptions of Explanatory and Control Variables 
 
            
  
            
VARIABLES   SOURCE YEAR(S)   DESCRIPTION 
          
  
  
Stigma 
  
Flash 
EB 
  2007-09 
Mean 
  Statement 'people who have started their own business and have failed 
should be given a second chance.'  Responses were weighted (-2, 2) 
with (2) = strongly disagree, (-2) = strongly agree that entrepreneurs 
should be given a second chance.  
Regulatory 
Conveyance of 
Stigma 
  WDI    2005-08 
Mean 
  
Depth of Credit Index of rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and 
quality of credit information available through either public or private 
credit registries. Ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the 
availability of more credit information to facilitate lending decisions.  
Age & Age Squared   GEM    2006-09 
  
Variables measure the age of the respondent  (continuous) 
Gender   GEM   2006-09 
  
Binary variable (female =  2) 
Start-up Skill   GEM    2006-09 
  
% population aged 18-DJUHHLQJZLWKVWDWHPHQW³\RXKDYHWKHVNLOOV
NQRZOHGJHDQGH[SHULHQFHWRVWDUWDEXVLQHVV´ 
Time to resolve 
insolvency (years) 
  WDI    2005-08 
Mean 
  
The time (in calendar years) required by bankruptcy proceedings 
involving domestic entities. Indicator variable constructed from WDI 
data ("1" = 1.5 years or less; "2" = up to 3yrs; "3" = more than 3 years).   
GDP Growth (per 
capita)  
  WDI      2005-08 
Mean 
  Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant 
local currency.  
National Fear of 
Failure 
  GEM        2006-09 
Mean 
  % population aged 18-64 agreeing with statement: ³Iear of failure 
would prevent you from starting a business´. 
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TABLE 3 Descriptive Statistics 
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Early Reentry .24 .43
2 Late Reentry .16 .37
3 Corporate Reentry .10 .30
4 Autonomous Reentry .14 .35
5 Sole Owner Reentry .10 .30
6 Start Up Skill .79 .41 .113 * .069 * .053 * .093 * .118 *
7 Female 1.40 .49 -.116 * -.031 -.080 * -.074 * -.092 * -.125 *
8 Age 43 11.76 -.097 * -.131 * -.074 * -.049 * -.036 .069 * -.012
9 GDP growth 3.14 2.68 -.020 .080 * .018 -.042 * -.022 -.015 -.026 -.018
10 Stigma 1.11 .20 -.040 * -.007 -.003 -.052 * -.056 * .027 .017 .072 * .059 *
11 Regulatory Conveyance 4.67 1.09 -.026 .029 -.094 * .048 * -.012 .036 .052 * .053 * -.153 * -.296 *
12 Insolvency Time 1.85 .79 .012 .076 * .083 * -.055 * .004 -.043 * -.033 -.081 * .245 * -.076 * -.428 *
13 GEM Fear of Failure 34.22 7.10 -.010 .010 -.029 .012 .002 -.067 * -.014 -.081 * -.013 -.216 * -.107 * -.033
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Dependent Variables
Explanatory Variables (N=2607)
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TABLE 4 Regression Models of Early Stage Reentry 
(N=2607; 23 Country Clusters)
Odds 
Ratio
Std. 
Err.
Odds 
Ratio
Std. 
Err.
Odds 
Ratio
Std. 
Err.
   Constant 0.32 *** 0.09 0.36 *** 0.10 0.37 *** 0.09
Individual Control Variables
   Start Up Skill 2.06 *** 0.36 2.07 *** 0.35 1.98 *** 0.33
   Female 0.59 *** 0.06 0.60 *** 0.06 0.58 *** 0.06
   Age 0.98 *** 0.01 0.98 *** 0.00 0.98 *** 0.00
   Age Squared 1.01 0.01 1.01 0.00 1.00 0.00
Country Control Variables
   GDP Growth 0.97 0.03 0.98 0.03 0.97 0.03
   National Fear of Failure 1.00 0.01 0.99 0.01 1.01 0.01
   Insolvency Time 1.04 0.13 0.96 0.11 0.94 0.09
Main Effects
   Stigma 0.48 ** 0.18 0.30 *** 0.11
   Regulatory Conveyance 0.90 0.12 0.99 0.09
Interaction Effects
   Stigma X Reg. Conveyance 0.26 ** 0.12
              2LL
             Wald Chi2 *** *** ***
              Pseudo R2
ǻ52 0.003
(*** p<  0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<  0.10)
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
-1392.67 -1374.88
180.97
0.046
0.009
90.36
0.033
-1388.32
212.83
0.036
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TABLE 5 Regression Models of Late Stage Reentry 
(N=2607; 23 Country Clusters)
Odds 
Ratio
Std. 
Err.
Odds 
Ratio
Std. 
Err.
Odds 
Ratio
Std. 
Err.
Constant 0.10 *** 0.05 0.08 *** 0.03 0.08 *** 0.03
Individual Control Variables
   Start Up Skill 1.81 *** 0.26 1.81 *** 0.27 1.89 *** 0.30
   Female 0.88 0.11 0.86 0.10 0.88 0.11
   Age 0.97 *** 0.01 0.96 *** 0.00 0.97 *** 0.00
   Age Squared 1.00 * 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Country Control Variables
   GDP Growth 1.06 0.04 1.06 * 0.04 1.07 ** 0.03
   National Fear of Failure 1.00 0.01 1.01 0.02 1.00 0.01
   Insolvency Time 1.19 0.25 1.41 ** 0.24 1.39 ** 0.22
Main Effects
   Stigma 1.84 1.28 2.30 1.53
   Regulatory Conveyance 1.31 ** 0.14 1.18 ** 0.10
Interaction Effects
   Stigma X Reg. Conveyance 3.37 *** 1.27
              2LL
             Wald Chi2 *** *** ***
              Pseudo R2
ǻ52 0.009 0.006
(*** p<  0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<  0.10)
148.96 170.45 274.8
0.039 0.048 0.054
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
-1094.34 -1085.05 -1077.67
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TABLE 6 Regression Models of Sole Owner Reentry 
(N=2607; 23 Country Clusters)
Odds 
Ratio
Std. 
Err.
Odds 
Ratio
Std. 
Err.
Odds 
Ratio
Std. 
Err.
Constant 0.07 *** 0.03 0.08 *** 0.03 0.08 *** 0.03
Individual Control Variables
   Start Up Skill 3.77 *** 0.85 3.79 *** 0.83 3.63 *** 0.78
   Female 0.56 *** 0.08 0.57 *** 0.08 0.55 *** 0.08
   Age 0.99 ** 0.01 0.99 * 0.01 0.99 ** 0.01
   Age Squared 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Country Control Variables
   GDP Growth 0.97 0.03 0.97 0.03 0.97 0.03
   National Fear of Failure 1.00 0.01 0.99 0.01 1.01 0.01
   Insolvency Time 1.04 0.11 0.94 0.09 0.91 0.08
Main Effects
   Stigma 0.29 ** 0.13 0.17 *** 0.07
   Regulatory Conveyance 0.88 0.12 0.96 0.09
Interaction Effects
   Stigma X Reg. Conveyance 0.25 ** 0.12
              2LL
             Wald Chi2 *** *** ***
              Pseudo R2
ǻ52
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
-820.31 -815.11 -808.26
64.84 95.83 121.54
0.040 0.046 0.054
0.006 0.008
(*** p<  0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<  0.10)
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TABLE 7 Regression Models of Corporate Reentry 
(N=2607; 23 Country Clusters)
Odds 
Ratio
Std. 
Err.
Odds 
Ratio
Std. 
Err.
Odds 
Ratio
Std. 
Err.
Constant 0.07 *** 0.04 0.10 *** 0.04 0.10 *** 0.04
Individual Control Variables
   Start Up Skill 1.63 ** 0.39 1.62 ** 0.37 1.51 * 0.34
   Female 0.58 *** 0.09 0.59 *** 0.09 0.57 *** 0.09
   Age 0.98 *** 0.01 0.98 *** 0.01 0.98 *** 0.01
   Age Squared 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Country Control Variables
   GDP Growth 0.99 0.04 0.99 0.04 0.98 0.04
   National Fear of Failure 0.98 0.02 0.98 0.02 1.00 0.02
   Insolvency Time 1.40 0.29 1.19 0.18 1.16 0.16
Main Effects
   Stigma 0.53 0.28 0.22 ** 0.12
   Regulatory Conveyance 0.78 0.12 0.93 0.11
Interaction Effects
   Stigma X Reg. Conveyance 0.15 ** 0.09
              2LL
             Wald Chi2 *** *** ***
              Pseudo R2
ǻ52 0.008 0.016
41.76 46.78 46.44
0.034 0.042 0.057
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
-804.08 -797.85 -784.97
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TABLE 8 Regression Models of Autonomous Reentry 
(N=2607; 23 Country Clusters)
Odds 
Ratio
Std. 
Err.
Odds 
Ratio
Std. 
Err.
Odds 
Ratio
Std. 
Err.
Constant 0.21 *** 0.06 0.21 *** 0.06 0.21 *** 0.06
Individual Control Variables
   Start Up Skill 2.11 *** 0.29 2.11 *** 0.28 2.07 *** 0.28
   Female 0.67 *** 0.08 0.67 *** 0.08 0.66 *** 0.08
   Age 0.99 ** 0.01 0.99 ** 0.01 0.99 ** 0.01
   Age Squared 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Country Control Variables
   GDP Growth 0.97 * 0.02 0.97 0.02 0.97 0.02
   National Fear of Failure 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.01 1.01 0.01
   Insolvency Time 0.83 ** 0.05 0.83 ** 0.06 0.82 ** 0.06
Main Effects
   Stigma 0.49 ** 0.12 0.43 *** 0.10
   Regulatory Conveyance 1.04 0.06 1.07 0.06
Interaction Effects
   Stigma X Reg. Conveyance 0.62 ** 0.14
              2LL
             Wald Chi2 *** *** ***
              Pseudo R2
ǻ52 0.003 0.001
(*** p<  0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<  0.10)
79.71 202.63 218.15
0.027 0.030 0.031
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
-1045.33 -1041.74 -1040.66
 
